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Disability and Age Discrimination in the California Workplace

Wage & Hour 5 min read Updated 2026-03-05

About this guide

Disability and age are both protected characteristics under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), but the two categories operate very differently in practice. Disability law is built around an ongoing, forward-looking duty: the employer must communicate with the worker and adjust the job where it reasonably can. Age law contains no comparable accommodation duty; it is concerned with whether age influenced a decision, and it carries a distinctive set of rules governing what a valid release of age claims must contain. Because many workers encounter both issues at once — an older employee with a medical condition who is selected for a layoff, for example — this guide covers them together while keeping their mechanics separate.

This guide is general legal information published by Wiser Workplace, a technology platform. Wiser Workplace is not a law firm, does not provide legal advice, and does not represent anyone or apply the law to any individual's circumstances. Nothing here predicts how any particular situation would be resolved, and nothing here should be treated as a substitute for advice from a licensed California attorney or for guidance from the enforcing agencies themselves. Statutes, regulations, agency procedures, and benefit amounts change; the citations below reflect the primary sources as published at the time of writing, and readers should confirm current text and current agency practice directly.

Every legal proposition in this guide is tied to a primary source — the California Government Code and Labor Code via the Legislature's official site, the United States Code and Code of Federal Regulations via GovInfo, and the current public pages of the California Civil Rights Department (CRD), the Employment Development Department (EDD), and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Where a point could not be verified against a primary source, the guide says so rather than asserting it.

Who is covered: the three statutes and their thresholds

Three statutes do most of the work in this area, and they cover different employers. FEHA defines "employer" to include "any person regularly employing five or more persons," along with state and local government entities (Gov. Code § 12926(d)). The federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) reaches an employer with "15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks" (42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A)). The federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) reaches an employer with "twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year" (29 U.S.C. § 630(b)).

The practical consequence is that California's five-employee threshold makes FEHA applicable to a large population of smaller employers that the federal statutes never reach. A worker at a seven-person California company is generally outside the ADA's and the ADEA's employer coverage but within FEHA's. This is one of several reasons California disability and age matters are usually analyzed under state law first.

Harassment is treated separately and more broadly. CRD states that while "[e]mployers of five or more are subject to the FEHA's prohibition against employment discrimination," harassment "is prohibited in all workplaces, even those with only one employee or independent contractor on staff." Age-based and disability-based harassment therefore reach employers too small to be covered by FEHA's discrimination provisions.

Whether a specific employer meets a given threshold — and how employees are counted for that purpose — is a fact-specific question that a worker or employer should take to their own attorney or to the agency.

How FEHA defines disability, and why it is broader than the ADA

The single most consequential difference between California and federal disability law is the threshold a condition must cross. The Legislature addressed this directly in Government Code § 12926.1, which declares that "[t]he law of this state in the area of disabilities provides protections independent from those in the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990." Subdivision (c) makes the contrast explicit: "the definitions of 'physical disability' and 'mental disability' under the law of this state require a 'limitation' upon a major life activity, but do not require, as does the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, a 'substantial limitation.'" The statute states that "[t]his distinction is intended to result in broader coverage under the law of this state than under that federal act."

That language is carried into the operative definitions. FEHA's definition of mental disability turns on a condition that "limits a major life activity" (Gov. Code § 12926(j)(1)(B)), and the definition of physical disability uses the same formulation (Gov. Code § 12926(m)(1)(B)). CRD's own published guidance restates the point for the public: "Under California law, a disability must only 'limit' a major life activity. The disability does not have to involve a 'substantial limitation,' as under federal law, to be considered a disability."

Two further features widen the definition. First, whether a condition limits a major life activity is "determined without regard to mitigating measures" — CRD describes this as being assessed "regardless of any mitigating measure, such as medication or prosthesis, unless the mitigating measure itself limits a major life activity" (Gov. Code § 12926(j)(1)(A), (m)(1)(B)(i)). Second, major life activities "shall be broadly construed and shall include physical, mental, and social activities and working" (Gov. Code § 12926(j)(1)(C), (m)(1)(B)(iii)), and § 12926.1(c) adds that "working" counts "regardless of whether the actual or perceived working limitation implicates a particular employment or a class or broad range of employments."

FEHA also protects people who are regarded as disabled. Section 12926.1 extends coverage to individuals "erroneously or mistakenly believed to have any physical or mental condition that limits a major life activity." Separately, FEHA protects "medical condition," which § 12926(i) defines as health impairments related to a cancer diagnosis or history, or genetic characteristics associated with disease risk — CRD summarizes this as covering "medical conditions, which are defined as either cancer or genetic characteristics." CRD also states that the law "covers mental or physical disabilities, including HIV/AIDS, regardless of whether the conditions are presently disabling."

The definition has express carve-outs. Section 12926(j) states that mental disability "does not include sexual behavior disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, or psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from the current unlawful use of controlled substances or other drugs."

Whether any particular diagnosis or set of symptoms meets these definitions is not something a guide can resolve. That determination depends on the individual's specific medical facts and job, and it is a question for a licensed attorney or for the agency.

Reasonable accommodation and undue hardship

FEHA makes it an unlawful employment practice for a covered employer to fail to "make reasonable accommodation for the known physical or mental disability of an applicant or employee" (Gov. Code § 12940(m)). The same subdivision provides that an employer may not "retaliate or otherwise discriminate against a person for requesting accommodation" — meaning the act of asking is itself protected, independent of whether the request is ultimately granted.

Government Code § 12926(p) defines reasonable accommodation to include "[m]aking existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to, and usable by, individuals with disabilities," as well as "[j]ob restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations." CRD's guidance gives a plain-language version: accommodation "can include, but is not limited to, changing job duties or work hours, providing leave, relocating the work area, and/or providing mechanical or electrical aids." The list is illustrative, not exhaustive.

The limit on the duty is undue hardship. Government Code § 12926(u) defines it as "[a]n action requiring significant difficulty or expense," assessed against five enumerated factors: the nature and cost of the accommodation; the financial resources of the facility involved, the number of employees, and the effect on expenses and resources; the overall financial resources, size, and number and location of facilities of the covered entity; the type of operations, including the composition and structure of the workforce; and the geographic separateness or administrative and fiscal relationship of the facility to the covered entity. Because these factors are comparative, the same accommodation may be an undue hardship for one employer and routine for another.

FEHA contains an express defense where accommodation cannot bridge the gap. Section 12940(a)(1) provides that the statute does not prohibit an employer from refusing to hire or discharging an employee with a physical or mental disability who "is unable to perform the employee's essential duties even with reasonable accommodations, or cannot perform those duties in a manner that would not endanger the employee's health or safety or the health or safety of others even with reasonable accommodations." This is a narrower escape hatch than it may appear: it requires that no reasonable accommodation exist, not merely that the employer prefer not to provide one.

There is a notable textual difference between the state and federal safety standards. FEHA's § 12940(a)(1) expressly reaches danger to "the employee's health or safety or the health or safety of others." The ADA's statutory definition of "direct threat" in 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) is narrower on its face: "a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation." How these standards are applied in practice is a matter of case law and regulation beyond the scope of this guide.

CRD also identifies two employer justifications that its guidance describes as not legally acceptable: the "[p]ossibility of future harm to the person or to others," and the concern that "[e]mploying individuals with disabilities will cause an employer's insurance rates to rise." CRD's guidance further states that an employer "must allow an applicant the opportunity to submit an independent medical opinion if there is a dispute as to whether the person can perform the essential functions of a position with or without reasonable accommodation," and that failure to allow this "may be a separate violation of the law."

The interactive process

California treats the conversation about accommodation as a legal obligation in its own right. Government Code § 12940(n) makes it unlawful for an employer to fail "to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee or applicant to determine effective reasonable accommodations." This is a separate subdivision from the accommodation duty in § 12940(m), and CRD states the obligation plainly: "In California, it is unlawful for an employer to fail to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process."

CRD describes the trigger as a request: "Employers must initiate an 'interactive process' when an applicant or employee requests reasonable accommodations." Its disability guidance frames the timing as preceding the decision — an employer "is required to interact with an employee to explore all possible means of reasonably accommodating a person prior to rejecting the person for a job or making any employment-related decision."

No particular paperwork is required. CRD publishes sample request and interactive-process forms but states that "[t]he law does not require the use of these or any other forms to make a request for a reasonable accommodation or to engage in an effective, good faith interactive process." The forms are offered as optional tools for both employers and employees.

CRD's guidance also notes that the need for an accommodation "may arise from a mitigating measure, such as medication taken for the primary disability" — so the process can be prompted by the side effects of treatment, not only by the underlying condition.

Leave as an accommodation, and how it interacts with CFRA, FMLA, SDI, and workers' compensation

Leave can itself be a form of reasonable accommodation. CRD lists "providing leave" among the examples of reasonable accommodation in its disability guidance, and its accommodation page identifies "[p]roviding leave for medical care" as an example. CRD is also explicit that this is a distinct entitlement: employees with disabilities "may have separate rights to unpaid leave under federal and state family leave laws, distinct from the reasonable accommodation requirement." A worker who has exhausted a protected leave entitlement is not, for that reason alone, outside the accommodation analysis.

The California Family Rights Act (CFRA) operates on its own terms. Government Code § 12945.2 applies to "[a]ny person who directly employs five or more persons," and an eligible employee is one with "more than 12 months of service with the employer, and who has at least 1,250 hours of service with the employer during the previous 12-month period." Eligible employees may take "up to a total of 12 workweeks in any 12-month period." The statute defines "serious health condition" as "an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves either of the following: (A) Inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential health care facility. (B) Continuing treatment or continuing supervision by a health care provider." CFRA leave generally runs concurrently with federal FMLA leave, except for FMLA leave taken for disability on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.

Job protection and wage replacement are separate systems, and conflating them is a common source of confusion. EDD's State Disability Insurance (SDI) program provides temporary partial wage replacement for non-work-related illness, injury, pregnancy, childbirth, surgery, or rehabilitation. EDD states that a claimant "may be eligible to receive between $50 to $1,765 each week for up to 52 weeks," replacing roughly 70 to 90 percent of prior wages, with eligibility conditions including inability to work for at least eight days, at least $300 in base-period wages subject to SDI contributions, and physician certification. Critically, EDD states that SDI does not provide job protection, and that a job "may be protected through other federal or state laws such as the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) or the California Family Rights Act (CFRA)." Benefit amounts and maximums are set annually and should be confirmed on EDD's current page.

Workers' compensation is a fourth, independent track. A work-related injury may generate a workers' compensation claim while the same condition simultaneously qualifies as a disability under FEHA — the two systems ask different questions and provide different remedies, and a rating or determination in one does not resolve the other. Labor Code § 132a separately declares the policy that "[t]here should not be discrimination against workers who are injured in the course and scope of their employment," and prohibits discharging or threatening to discharge an employee for filing or intending to file a workers' compensation claim, discriminating against an employee who has received a rating, award, or settlement, and retaliating against a worker who testifies in another employee's case. Under § 132a, an affected employee may receive compensation increased by one-half up to a maximum of $10,000, plus reinstatement and reimbursement for lost wages and benefits, and costs and expenses up to $250. A petition under § 132a must be filed with the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board within one year of the discriminatory act or termination — a materially shorter window than FEHA's.

Because these four systems have different coverage rules, different deadlines, and different remedies, sequencing decisions among them are exactly the kind of question a worker should bring to their own attorney rather than resolve from a general guide.

Medical inquiries, examinations, and confidentiality

FEHA restricts what an employer may ask and when. Government Code § 12940(e) generally prohibits pre-offer medical and psychological examinations and inquiries. CRD's guidance describes the prohibition as covering "[r]equiring any medical or psychological examination or related inquiry of any applicant or employee prior to making an offer of employment," "[i]nquiring directly or indirectly as to whether an applicant or employee has a mental or physical disability or medical condition," and "[i]nquiring about the nature and severity of a mental or physical disability or medical condition." CRD notes the permitted alternative: an employer "may inquire into the ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions."

After an offer, the rules loosen but do not disappear. Section 12940(e) permits an employer to "require a medical or psychological examination... after an employment offer has been made but prior to commencement of employment duties, provided that... all entering employees in the same job classification are subject to the same examination." CRD adds that such an examination or inquiry "must be job related and consistent with business necessity."

For current employees, § 12940(f) permits examinations and inquiries the employer can demonstrate are "job related and consistent with business necessity." The federal standard is worded almost identically: 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4) prohibits examinations and disability-related inquiries of employees "unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity."

Confidentiality is handled most explicitly in the federal statute. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3), information obtained about an applicant's medical condition or history must be "collected and maintained on separate forms and in separate medical files and is treated as a confidential medical record." CRD applies a parallel expectation to voluntary employee health programs, stating that an employer "may also conduct voluntary medical examinations, including medical histories, as part of an employee health program," that this "information must be retained separate and apart from employment and personnel records," and that employers "may not penalize employees for declining to participate in voluntary medical examinations."

FEHA separately restricts genetic testing. Government Code § 12940(o) makes it unlawful for an employer to "subject... any employee, applicant, or other person to a test for the presence of a genetic characteristic."

Age discrimination under FEHA and the ADEA

FEHA's protection begins at 40. Government Code § 12926(b) provides that "'[a]ge' refers to the chronological age of any individual who has reached a 40th birthday." The federal threshold is the same: 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) states that "[t]he prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age." Neither statute sets an upper age limit. CRD's public materials list "Age (40 and over)" among protected characteristics and state that age protections "begin at the age of 40," not only at retirement age.

The employer-coverage gap between the two statutes matters more for age than for most categories. FEHA reaches employers with five or more employees, while the ADEA requires twenty or more. A very large share of California workplaces are covered by the state age-discrimination prohibition but not the federal one.

California has legislated on the method of proof. Government Code § 12941 declares the Legislature's intent that "the disparate impact theory of proof may be used in claims of age discrimination," and addresses a specific pattern: the use of salary as the basis for differentiating among employees when terminating employment "may be found to constitute age discrimination if use of that criterion adversely impacts older workers as a group." The section also states that age discrimination protections are to be interpreted "broadly and vigorously, in a manner comparable to prohibitions against sex and race discrimination."

Age-based harassment is covered as well. CRD's age guidance identifies workplace conduct such as "comments, jokes, or insults about age" as capable of contributing to a hostile work environment, and gives repeated remarks of the "Okay, Boomer" variety as an illustration. As with disability harassment, FEHA's harassment provisions reach workplaces below the five-employee discrimination threshold.

Evidence patterns commonly discussed in age cases

Employment decisions are rarely announced in terms of age, so age cases typically turn on circumstantial evidence. It is useful for readers to understand, in general terms, the categories of evidence that recur in this area — while recognizing that identifying a category says nothing about whether any particular set of facts would succeed. No general guide can evaluate the strength of an individual situation, and nothing in this section should be read as suggesting that a given pattern indicates a viable claim.

One recurring category concerns selection criteria in a reduction in force. Where an employer reduces headcount, attention often falls on how the pool of candidates for elimination was defined, what criteria were applied, whether those criteria were applied consistently, and whether the criteria correlate with age. Government Code § 12941's treatment of salary-based differentiation is a legislative recognition of one version of this concern: a facially neutral criterion that tracks seniority or compensation may fall more heavily on older workers as a group.

A second category concerns what happened to the work after the employee left — whether the position was eliminated outright, absorbed by existing staff, or filled by someone substantially younger, and whether the duties actually changed. A third category concerns statements: remarks about age, retirement plans, "energy," or generational fit, and questions such as who made the remark, how close in time and role the speaker was to the decision, and whether the remark was isolated or part of a pattern.

A fourth category concerns consistency — whether the stated reason for the decision matches the employee's documented performance history, whether the explanation shifted over time, and whether comparably situated younger employees were treated differently in similar circumstances.

These are descriptive categories drawn from how the subject is generally organized, not a checklist and not a test. How courts weigh any of them involves case law that this guide does not attempt to summarize, and how they apply to an individual's facts is a question for that person's own attorney.

Severance agreements and the OWBPA: what a valid age-claim waiver requires

Federal law imposes specific, itemized requirements before a worker can give up an age-discrimination claim. The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act amended the ADEA to provide that an individual "may not waive any right or claim under this chapter unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary," and 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) sets out minimum conditions that must all be met. These requirements are unusually concrete, and they are worth stating precisely because a severance agreement that omits any of them may not accomplish what the employer intended as to age claims.

Under § 626(f)(1), the waiver must be "part of an agreement between the individual and the employer that is written in a manner calculated to be understood" by the individual (subparagraph (A)); it must "specifically refer[] to rights or claims arising under this chapter" (subparagraph (B)) — the EEOC describes this as a requirement that the agreement "expressly spell out the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) by name"; it must not waive "rights or claims that may arise after the date" of execution (subparagraph (C)); it must exchange the waiver "only... for consideration in addition to anything of value to which the individual already is entitled" (subparagraph (D)); and the individual must be "advised in writing to consult with an attorney prior to executing the agreement" (subparagraph (E)).

Two timing rules follow. Subparagraph (F) requires that "the individual is given a period of at least 21 days within which to consider the agreement" — or, "if a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive or other employment termination program offered to a group or class of employees, the individual is given a period of at least 45 days within which to consider the agreement." Subparagraph (G) requires that "the agreement provides that for a period of at least 7 days following the execution of such agreement, the individual may revoke the agreement, and the agreement shall not become effective or enforceable until the revocation period has expired." The EEOC states that "[t]he seven-day revocation period cannot be changed or waived by either party for any reason." The consideration periods operate differently: an individual may sign before the 21 or 45 days elapse if the decision is knowing and voluntary and not induced by the employer, and under the implementing regulation material changes to the offer restart the period while immaterial changes do not.

Group layoffs carry an additional disclosure obligation. Where a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive or other termination program offered to a group or class, § 626(f)(1)(H) requires the employer to inform the individual in writing, at the beginning of the consideration period, of "any class, unit, or group of individuals covered by such program, any eligibility factors for such program, and any time limits applicable to such program," and of "the job titles and ages of all individuals eligible or selected for the program, and the ages of all individuals in the same job classification or organizational unit who are not eligible or selected for the program." The scope of that disclosure is governed by the "decisional unit" — described in the implementing regulation as the portion of the employer's organizational structure from which the participants were selected. EEOC guidance states that the disclosure must identify "the class, unit, or group of employees from which the employer chose the employees who were and who were not selected," together with job titles and ages, and that age information should not be presented in bands broader than one year.

Two further points are structural. First, § 626(f)(3) places the burden of proof on "the party asserting the validity of a waiver" to demonstrate in court that the waiver was knowing and voluntary — that is, on the employer, not the employee. Second, a waiver cannot cut off the agency. The EEOC states that no waiver agreement may bar an individual from filing a charge with the EEOC or participating in an EEOC investigation or proceeding, and that "[n]o agreement between you and your employer can limit your right to testify, assist, or participate in an investigation, hearing, or proceeding conducted by the EEOC." The EEOC also states that, for ADEA claims, "an employee is not required to return severance pay — or other consideration received for signing the waiver — before bringing an age discrimination claim."

The OWBPA governs waivers of federal age claims. Whether and how a release affects claims under California law, including FEHA claims, involves separate state-law requirements that this guide does not cover. Anyone deciding whether to sign a severance agreement, or evaluating one already signed, should have it reviewed by their own attorney — and the consideration periods in § 626(f)(1)(F) exist precisely to make that possible.

Retaliation

FEHA protects the act of objecting. Government Code § 12940(h) makes it unlawful to "discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because the person has opposed any practices forbidden under this part or because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding" under FEHA. CRD confirms that "the FEHA prohibits retaliation for exercising a FEHA right, such as filing a complaint about discrimination," and its age guidance states that "[i]t is unlawful to retaliate against an employee" for complaining about age discrimination or participating in investigations.

In the disability context there is an additional, specific protection. Government Code § 12940(m) provides that an employer may not "retaliate or otherwise discriminate against a person for requesting accommodation," and that protection applies regardless of whether the requested accommodation was ultimately granted or whether the requester is ultimately found to have a qualifying disability.

FEHA also imposes an affirmative preventive duty. Section 12940(k) makes it unlawful for an employer to "fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring." This is a distinct obligation from the prohibition on discriminating in the first instance.

Retaliation protections operate independently of the underlying claim, which is why a complaint that does not itself succeed may still be protected activity. How that principle applies to particular facts is a legal question for an attorney or the agency.

Deadlines and how a complaint is filed

California's administrative deadline is three years. Government Code § 12960(e)(5) provides that a complaint alleging a violation of Article 1 (commencing with § 12940) "shall not be filed after the expiration of three years from the date upon which the unlawful practice or refusal to cooperate occurred." CRD states the same rule in plain terms in its public materials: complaints "must be filed within three years of the last act of discrimination," and its complaint-process page instructs that in employment cases a person must submit an intake form "within three years of the date you were last harmed." Section 12960(e)(6) provides for limited extensions in specified circumstances.

The federal deadline is much shorter. Under 29 U.S.C. § 626(d), an ADEA charge must be filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice, or within 300 days where a deferral state's law applies. The EEOC states that the baseline is 180 calendar days and that the deadline extends to 300 days "if a state or local agency enforces a law that prohibits employment discrimination on the same basis." For age specifically, the EEOC notes an important limitation: the 300-day extension applies only "if there is a state law prohibiting age discrimination in employment and a state agency or authority enforcing that law," and is "not extended if only a local law prohibits age discrimination." California has both a state age-discrimination statute (FEHA) and a state enforcement agency (CRD). Readers should nonetheless confirm the applicable federal deadline with the EEOC directly, because the difference between 180 and 300 days is consequential and depends on how the charge is characterized.

The three-year state deadline and the 180/300-day federal deadline run at the same time. A person who waits past the federal window may retain state remedies while having lost federal ones. Because the two clocks differ so sharply, timing questions should be raised with an attorney or the agency early rather than late.

Procedurally, CRD begins with an intake form submitted through its California Civil Rights System, and states that submission "will initiate an intake interview with a CRD representative." An unfiled complaint started in the system remains available for 30 days. CRD notes that "[i]n employment cases only, you must obtain an immediate Right-to-Sue notice from CRD before filing your own lawsuit in court," and that it processes complaints filed by persons with terminal illnesses on a priority basis. CRD offers accommodations in its own intake process, including scribing intake by phone and access through the California Relay Service.

Once a right-to-sue notice issues, a second clock starts. Government Code § 12965(c)(1)(D) provides that the person claiming to be aggrieved "may bring a civil action under this part... within one year from the date of that notice." Section 12965(c)(1)(A) provides for a notice where CRD does not bring a civil action within 150 days after the complaint is filed, or determines that no action will be brought. Section 12965(e) provides that the one-year period is tolled where a charge "is timely filed concurrently with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the department" and CRD defers its investigation to the EEOC; in that circumstance, the time to commence an action "expires when the federal right-to-sue period to commence a civil action expires, or one year from the date of the right-to-sue notice by the department, whichever is later."

Deadlines in this area are unforgiving and their application to specific facts — including when a limitations period began to run — is a legal question. Anyone approaching a deadline should consult an attorney or contact the agency rather than rely on a general description.

Remedies

Remedies vary considerably depending on the statute invoked, the forum, the nature of the violation, and the facts. No general guide can indicate what any particular situation is worth, and this guide does not attempt to.

CRD describes its own process as one in which the department "serves as an objective fact-finder and attempts to help the parties voluntarily resolve disputes." Where CRD finds sufficient evidence and settlement efforts fail, CRD states that it "may file a lawsuit in civil court on behalf of the complaining party, after a mandatory mediation." CRD identifies remedies a court may order as including damages for emotional distress from each employer or person in violation of the law; hiring or reinstatement; back pay or promotion; changes in the policies or practices of the employer; punitive damages; and reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

CRD also notes the private path: employees "can also pursue the matter through a private lawsuit in civil court after a complaint has been filed with CRD and a Right-to-Sue Notice has been issued."

Remedies under the federal ADEA are structured differently from FEHA remedies, and this guide does not summarize them; that comparison should be confirmed with the EEOC or with counsel. Similarly, remedies under Labor Code § 132a are set by that statute — compensation increased by one-half up to $10,000, reinstatement, reimbursement of lost wages and benefits, and costs and expenses up to $250 — and are separate from anything available under FEHA.

Where to get help

This guide describes general rules. It does not evaluate any individual's situation, and the questions that matter most in practice — whether a particular condition qualifies, whether an employer met a coverage threshold, whether a particular accommodation was reasonable, whether a deadline has run, whether a severance agreement is enforceable — all depend on specific facts and require individualized legal analysis.

Workers and employers seeking information about the California process can contact the Civil Rights Department directly. CRD publishes its complaint process at calcivilrights.ca.gov/complaintprocess and lists a toll-free line at (800) 884-1684, TTY at (800) 700-2320, and email at contact.center@calcivilrights.ca.gov. CRD states that it can accommodate people with disabilities in its intake process, including by scribing intake by phone or through the California Relay Service at 711.

For federal claims, including ADEA charges and questions about severance waivers under the OWBPA, the EEOC is the enforcing agency and publishes guidance on charge deadlines and on waivers in severance agreements.

For advice about a specific situation, a licensed California attorney is the appropriate resource. Wiser Workplace is a technology platform, not a law firm; it publishes general legal information and does not provide legal advice, does not represent anyone, and does not apply the law to any individual's facts.

Important Disclaimer: This guide is for general informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. No attorney-client relationship is created by reading this guide. Employment law changes often and every situation is different. If you need legal advice about your specific situation, please consult a qualified California employment attorney.

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